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Abstract
This paper has three objectives. It discusses the main developments and new issues that 
have arisen after the Monterrey Conference. It critically reviews the Monterrey Consensus 
on external debt. It provides a set of recommendations for reviewing the implementation of 
the Monterrey Consensus, to take place in Doha, Qatar, in December 2008. In doing so, 
the paper discusses the shortcomings of standard debt sustainability exercises; it presents 
new results on the additionality of debt relief; and discusses the need for developing new 
financial instruments and institutions aimed at reducing the risks of sovereign and external 
borrowing. The paper also briefly discusses issues related to the definition of external debt 
and touches on the odious debt debate. ix The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
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I.  Introduction
The analysis of the costs and benefits of external 
borrowing by developing countries has been at the 
centre of the development debate for at least fifty 
years. And yet, with five short paragraphs, “external 
debt” is the Cinderella of the “leading actions” listed 
in the Monterrey Consensus. These five paragraphs 
highlight that the responsibility for debt crises should 
be fairly shared between creditors and debtors, they 
argue for the creation of a mechanism for the resolu-
tion of sovereign debt crises, and request that debt 
relief should be delivered expeditiously and should 
be additional with respect to existing aid flows. They 
also suggest that the debt sustainability framework 
adopted by the Bretton Woods Institutions should be 
kept under constant review. 
This paper has three objectives. The first objec-
tive is to discuss the main developments and new 
issues that have arisen after the Monterrey Confer-
ence. The second objective is to critically review the 
Monterrey Consensus on external debt. The third 
objective is to provide a set of recommendations for 
the review of the implementation of the Monterrey 
Consensus that will take place in Doha, Qatar, in 
December 2008. In doing so, the paper discusses 
whether there are remaining areas that require major 
initiatives aimed at maximizing the development role 
of external debt while minimizing the risks that arise 
from external borrowing. 
A bird’s eye-view at the recent evolution of 
the developing countries’ external (and domestic) 
debt situation reveals several interesting patterns.1 
A comparison of the data for the year 2000 (the 
data available at the time of the formulation of the 
Monterrey Consensus) with those for 2006 shows 
lower average external deficits, lower external debt 
ratios (external debt went from 39 to 25 per cent of 
GNP, a 35 per cent decrease), and larger international 
reserves (table 1). The data show a dramatic change 
in the composition of borrowers and lenders. In 2000, 
50 per cent of public sector long-term external debt 
was owed to official (multilateral and bilateral) credi-
tors. In 2006, this share had dropped to 42 per cent. 
In 2000, external debt owed by private borrowers 
amounted to less than 30 per cent of total long-term 
external debt. By 2006, this share increased to 41 per 
cent. As a consequence, the share of total long-term 
external debt owed to private creditors increased from 
59 to 71 per cent.2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
In 2006, total international reserves of de-
veloping countries were about the same as the 
total external debt of these countries and reserves 
continued to increase at record rate during 2007 
reaching $3,719 billion at the end of 2007. As most 
international reserves are held in assets issued by 
the advanced economies, developing countries, as a 
group, no longer have a net external debt. In fact, they 
hold net external debt assets of about $350 billion. 
However, the second panel of table 1 shows 
that there is a wide dispersion in the behaviour of 
Table 1 




Total debt 2 267 2 851
Long-term debt 1 896 2 216
  Share of long-term external public debt owed to private creditors (per cent) 50 58
  Share of long-term external debt owed by private borrowers (per cent) 29 41
  Share of long-term external debt owed to private creditors (per cent) 59 71
International reserves 694 2 568
Debt indicators Per cent Per cent
Total debt/imports 123 74a
Total debt / GNP 39 25
Long-term external public debt/GNP 24 14a
Net present value of long-term external public debt/GNP 22 17a
Reserves/external debt 31 90




5th percentile -17.22 -13.69
95th percentile 16.16 19.81
Standard deviation 8.74 10.54
Weighted averages (GDP weight)
Mean 1.31 4.08
Median -0.11 1.57
5th percentile -5.79 -8.35
95th percentile 17.22 19.82
Standard deviation 6.34 8.21
Public debt
Simple averages
Total public debt (per cent of GDP) 69 64a
External public debt (per cent of total public debt) 65 60a
Weighted averages (GDP weight)
Total public debt (per cent of GDP) 43 39a
External public debt (per cent of total public debt) 41 31a
Source:  2007 Report of the Secretary General on Recent Trends in External Debt; Panizza (2008); and Dikhanov (2007).
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the current account of developing countries and that 
this dispersion was higher in 2006 than in 2000. 
Data weighted by the size of the economy show 
lower average current account deficits (or higher 
average surpluses) and lower external debt ratios. 
This indicates that most of the surplus countries are 
large economies and most of the deficit countries are 
small economies and that there are several develop-
ing countries with a net external debt. There are 
also large regional differences. Countries in Asia are 
characterized by fairly low external debt ratios and 
some countries in East Europe and Central Asia are 
characterized by large, and in some cases, increasing 
external debt ratios.
The third panel of table 1 focuses on the level 
and composition of developing countries’ total pubic 
debt. It shows a decrease in debt levels of approxi-
mately 5 percentage points and also a decrease in 
the share of public debt which is owed to external 
creditors. Again, this decrease was more marked in 
the larger economies.2 Also in this case, there are 
large regional differences. In East Europe, more than 
55 per cent of total public debt is owed to external 
creditors. In East and South Asia, external public debt 
is less than 30 per cent of total public debt. 
Thus, a quick look at the data shows a net 
improvement in the external debt situation of de-
veloping countries. However, if one moves beyond 
averages, it becomes clear that this improvement is 
partly driven by the behaviour of a few large countries 
and by that of a few countries that in the mid 1990s 
had extremely high debt ratios. It is also important 
to recognize that improvements in debt ratios are 
partly driven by favourable external conditions. An 
economic crisis in the developed world and a sudden 
jump in risk aversion of international investors could 
reverse the current positive trend. In fact, there are 
already some signs of deterioration in the external 
situation of developing countries. During 2007, two 
thirds of developing countries suffered a deteriora-
tion of their current account balance, 50 per cent of 
developing countries closed the year with a current 
account deficit greater than 5 per cent of GDP, and 
about a quarter of developing countries ran current 
account deficits greater than ten per cent of GDP 
(World Bank, 2008). The divergence in the behaviour 
of the current account and external debt situation of 
developing countries is partly driven by increases 
in commodity and food prices which have benefited 
commodity exporters but caused serious problems to 
commodity importers, especially low income oil and 
food importers. Private flows to developing countries 
started to slow down in late 2007 and collapsed in 
2008 and several developing countries are now hav-
ing problems financing their deficits. 
Data on the face value of debt can give a mis-
leading impression on the actual change in the value 
of external debt of developing countries. Part of the 
reduction in external debt was due to debt relief under 
the HIPC initiative. However, some of the cancelled 
debt had a present value which was well below its 
face value. Focusing on the net present value of debt 
shows a smaller decline in public external debt (5 
versus 10 percentage points). In fact, debt relief under 
the HIPC Initiative has not been fully successful in 
achieving long-term debt sustainability. According 
to the 2007 HIPC and MDRI Status of Implementa-
tion Report, more than half of the post-completion 
point countries are still considered as having either a 
moderate or a high risk of debt distress and only 10 
out 22 post-completion point countries have gradu-
ated to the low risk category.3 
The evidence summarized above points to the 
fact that it would be wrong to claim, as it is often 
done, that developing countries no longer have an 
external debt problem.
II.  A critical review of the main 
documents. Is there anything 
missing?
The objective of this section is to review the 
original Monterrey Consensus together with the 
Report of the United Nations Secretary General on 
the “Follow-up to and Implementation of the Inter-
national Conference on Financing for Development” 
and the “Summary by the President of the General 
Assembly of the High-Level Dialogue for Financing 
for Development.”4 
A.  The Monterrey Consensus
In their discussion on external debt, the heads of 
State and Government, who gathered in Monterrey 
in March 2002, agreed on the following four points. 
(The relevant paragraphs of the Monterrey Consensus 
are reported in parenthesis.) 4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
First, sustainable debt financing is an important 
source of resources for public and private investment, 
and debtors and creditors must share the responsibili-
ty for preventing debt crises (§47). As a consequence, 
it is necessary to put in place a set of principles for the 
management and resolution of financial crises. Such 
principles should yield a fair burden-sharing among 
all involved parties (§51). Second, debt sustainability 
not only requires prudent macroeconomic policies 
but also the ability to monitor and manage external 
liabilities. Thus, technical assistance for debt man-
agement should be strengthened (§47). Third, debt 
relief can play a key role in mobilizing resources that 
can lead to sustainable growth and thus it should be 
pursued “vigorously and expeditiously” (§48). The 
enhanced HIPC Initiative should be implemented 
in a speedy and effective way and should be “fully 
financed through additional resources” (§49). As a 
consequence, “donor countries [need] to take steps 
to ensure that resources provided for debt relief do 
not detract from ODA resources.” (§51). Fourth, debt 
sustainability should keep into account the impact 
of debt relief on progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The procedures used 
to asses debt sustainability “need to be kept under 
review” (§49) and should keep into account external 
and domestic shocks (§50). 
B.  The follow-up document
  The follow-up document provides a detailed 
discussion of the problems related to external debt. 
It starts by recognizing that even though external 
debt indicators of most developing countries have 
improved substantially (§1) there may be new vul-
nerabilities as a result of switching from public to 
private external borrowing (§7). Another problem 
highlighted in this document is the concentration of 
financial flows to developing countries, with a dozen 
countries absorbing 70 per cent of these flows (§2).
The document points to the positive results 
of various debt relief initiatives (§98 and §99) but 
suggests that the current approach for dealing with 
countries with debt servicing problems with official 
creditors needs to be more inclusive (§101). It also 
highlights the debt problems of middle income coun-
tries and casts doubt on the validity of the framework 
used to assess sustainability in these countries (§100). 
As a consequence, the document calls for further debt 
relief and for a “paradigm shift to debt restructuring 
approaches” (§102). It also points to the need for a 
fair mechanism for restructuring commercial debt 
(§107) and stresses that this topic should be discussed 
at the Doha conference (§108).
 
The main innovation of the follow-up document 
is its emphasis on debt composition. The document 
discusses the need to conduct a proper asset-liability 
management of sovereign debt and points to the 
importance of developing a domestic debt market 
(§103) aimed at reducing currency and maturity 
mismatches in a country’s balance sheet (§105). The 
document emphasizes the interaction between foreign 
borrowing and the working of the domestic financial 
system, and highlights the need for strengthening the 
domestic financial system before opening the capital 
account (§104). It also highlights the importance of 
keeping track of currency and maturity mismatches 
in the private sector, especially in the banking system 
(§107). 
C.  The summary by the President of the 
General Assembly
The summary of the discussion notes shows that 
many countries still have serious debt problems and 
a group of speakers pointed to the high debt burden 
of some middle income countries. Some speakers 
argued that 100 per cent official debt cancellation 
should be granted to all developing countries (§51). 
Many participants agreed on the importance of debt 
management and highlighted the importance of tech-
nical assistance in this area (§56), they also praised 
the Debt Sustainability Framework developed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(§52). However, other participants argued that this 
Framework should be reviewed in order to allow 
for more flexibility in the setting of its thresholds, to 
include “country-specific characteristics of sustain-
ability,” and avoid the use of subjective governance 
indicators (§53). Participants highlighted the interac-
tions among domestic debt, volatility of capital flows, 
and problems with credit rating agencies (§54, §55). 
Some participants focused on currency mismatches 
and suggested that there should be bilateral and 
multilateral support for developing risk-mitigation 
instruments (§55). Several participants highlighted 
the importance of developing a sovereign debt work-
out mechanism (§57).5 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
D.  Where to go next?
While the Monterrey Consensus focused on 
some broad principles, the other two documents pro-
vide a more detailed analysis of the main challenges 
faced by developing countries in the area of external 
debt and contain a few specific proposals. 
Rather than going through the tedious exercise 
of pointing out what is or is not missing from these 
documents, in the last section of this paper, I will 
try to write my own “consensus” paper on external 
debt. Clearly, this is a rhetorical exercise which has 
the benefit of hindsight and has the advantage of not 
being subject to the complicated negotiations that 
are at the basis of the other documents. Therefore, 
I can put forward ideas for which, at this stage, there 
is limited political support (one example is my sug-
gestion for creating a mechanism that would work 
in the spirit of the defunct SDRM). Even with these 
caveats in mind, having such a “Shadow Consensus” 
can be helpful in discussing what is missing from the 
previous documents and where to go next. 
III. Three key issues 
Before getting to the seven actions of the Shad-
ow Consensus, I would like to discuss in some detail 
three issues which, in my view, are at the core of the 
documents summarized in section III.B.5 These is-
sues are: (i) The World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability 
Framework; (ii) The additionality of debt relief; and 
(iii) The need for new instruments and institutions. 
A.  Rethinking the Debt Sustainability 
Framework
The Monterrey Consensus asks to keep under 
review the methodology used to assess debt sustain-
ability (§49). The standard approach for conducting 
debt sustainability analysis in low income countries 
is the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) jointly 
developed by the IMF and the World Bank. The DSF 
aims at detecting vulnerabilities and devising poli-
cies that can reduce the probability of a debt distress 
episode. In doing so, the framework is also used to 
guide grant allocation by the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA is the concessional arm of 
the World Bank). 
The Framework formulates long and medium-
term projections on the evolution of various debt 
ratios and compares these projections with debt bur-
den thresholds based on the quality of policies. Based 
on this comparison, countries are then classified 
into four groups: (i) Low Risk; (ii) Moderate Risk; 
(iii) High Risk; and (iv) in Debt Distress.6 High risk 
IDA countries (AKA “Red Light” countries) receive 
100 per cent grant financing from IDA at a 20 per cent 
volume discount (i.e., they receive less money but 
all the money they receive is in form of grants). Me-
dium risk IDA countries (“Yellow Light” countries) 
receive 50 per cent grant financing at a 10 per cent 
volume discount. Low risk countries (“Green Light” 
countries) receive no grant but are subject to no vol-
ume discount (i.e., they receive more money but no 
grants).7 This Framework has been the object of many 
criticisms based on both feasibility (Wyplosz, 2007) 
and fairness (Oddone, 2005) considerations.8 
While the Bank/Fund DSF is a step in the right 
direction, I do think that there are serious issues with 
the current formulation of the Framework. First, debt 
thresholds are fully determined by just one criteria: 
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index. Historical series for the 
CPIA index are not publicly disclosed; only data for 
IDA countries starting from 2005 are disclosed. All 
analyses that link debt sustainability to CPIA have 
been conducted by Bank/Fund staff and external 
researchers are not allowed to test the robustness of 
the links between these two variables.9 Another issue 
relates to the fact that, in my view, the quantitative 
impact of CPIA on the probability of debt distress is 
not large enough to formulate debt thresholds only 
based on CPIA.10 Finally, there is the issue of whether 
the CPIA is indeed a measure of policies or just a 
leading indicator of a debt crisis.11 
Part of the problem is that CPIA is an imperfect 
measure of policies, but this is not the whole story. 
There is also the issue that we do not always know what 
a good policy is and, even if we knew, we would need to 
recognize that not all types of bad policies and institu-
tions constrain economic development in the same way 
at all times or in all countries (Rodrik, 2008). 
Therefore, while it is reasonable to use a meas-
ure of policies (perhaps a more transparent one) as 
one of the criteria used to define debt thresholds, I do 
not agree with the approach of using the CPIA as the 
only criterion for defining debt thresholds. The risk of 
doing this is to replace “the former ‘one-size fits all’ 6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
approach to a ‘four or five-sizes fits all’ approach” 
(Report of the UN Secretary General on “Recent 
Trends in External Debt”, A/62/151, §32).12
 
The second problem with standard debt sustain-
ability analysis exercises is their insufficient emphasis 
on domestic public debt (this is especially a problem 
for the IMF debt sustainability framework for mid-
dle income countries). There are important linkages 
between the sustainability of domestic and exter-
nal debt. The most obvious among these linkages 
is that about 50 per cent of developing countries’ 
external debt is public debt and about 50 per cent 
of developing countries’ total public debt is issued 
externally (figure 1). But there are also less obvious 
linkages. Consider, for instance, a country with no 
public debt but a large external private debt. The in-
ability of private borrowers to service this debt can 
lead to a currency and banking crisis which can then 
have negative implications on fiscal sustainability. 
Moreover, crises can also originate in the market for 
domestic debt. There is, in fact, evidence that several 
external debt crises had their origin in the accumula-
tion of excessive domestic public debt (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008). 
The most important interaction between fiscal 
and external sustainability has to do with the behaviour 
of the exchange rate. A currency depreciation is often 
necessary for closing a current account deficit, and thus 
being able to repay external debt. However, since a 
large share of public debt in developing countries is 
denominated in foreign currency, a large devaluation 
can lead to a sudden jump in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
and have a negative effect on public debt sustainabil-
ity (Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza, 2006).13 
Hence, a currency appreciation can jointly 
have a positive effect on the sustainability of public 
debt and a negative effect on external sustainability. 
However, if this situation is associated with a rapid 
deterioration of the current account, the improve-
ment in fiscal conditions will only be temporary. This 
trade-off also implies that allowing for a currency 
devaluation in the presence of foreign currency debt 
may lead to a debt crisis and possibly to a costly debt 
default. This is why some developing countries suffer 
from “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; 
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein, 2001). 
These interactions between external and fiscal 
sustainability point to the fact that domestic debt 
should be included into DSA exercises. Currently, 
this is not common practice for at least two reasons. 
The first reason has to do with the fact that it is hard 
to find data on the level and composition of domestic 
debt (even worse, we do not even have a good defi-
nition of domestic and external debt).14 The second 
reason relates to the fact that different types of debt 
yield different vulnerabilities. Accordingly, it would 
be wrong to simply sum them to form a single debt 
ratio. Data availability problems could be solved if 
there were political will to do so. In fact, the League 
of Nations used to collect detailed data on the amount 
and composition of domestic public debt for both 
developed and developing economies and the United 
Nations continued to collect and publish such data 
until the early 1980s (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
The other problem could be solved by building an 
aggregate debt ratio which gives more weight to 
“riskier” (from the borrower’s point of view) types 
of debt and less weight to “safer” types of debt. This 
approach would be superior to the current practice 
which consists of either simply summing all types 
of debt (the equivalent to giving the same weight to 
all types of debt) or of just including external debt 
(the equivalent to giving a weight of one to all types 
of external debt and a weight of zero to all types of 
domestic debt). 
Figure 1
cOMPOSITION OF PUblIc DEbT IN 
DEvElOPING cOUNTRIES, 1994–2006
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The third problem with the standard DSF is 
that it is based on the primacy of debt service. Thus, 
it does not explicitly include an evaluation of what 
a country needs for achieving its own development 
goals. Maybe “green light” countries should re-
ceive no financing because they cannot absorb the 
extra resources (this seems to be the case in some 
African countries, see Aiyar, Berg and Hussain, 
2005, and also, more in general, for a vast sample 
of aid recipients, see Aiyar and Ruthbah, 2008) and 
maybe “red light” countries should receive more 
grant financing than what is implied by DSF. In the 
future, DSF should do a better job at discriminating 
between these types of countries and take seriously 
the United Nations Secretary General’s suggestion 
that “… we should redefine debt sustainability as 
the level of debt that allows a country to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 
without an increase in debt ratios.” 15
The last problem has to do with the fact that 
countries may borrow to accumulate productive as-
sets. Programmes devised by the main international 
financial institutions often include explicit targets or 
limits for the primary budget deficit and, as current 
expenditure tends to be the most rigid component 
of the budget, investment is the typical adjustment 
variable when the deficit exceeds the target. One of 
the objectives of these targets is to help maintain 
or achieve fiscal sustainability. However, govern-
ment borrowing for investment is likely to have a 
different impact on long-term growth, and thus tax 
revenues, than debt incurred to finance current ex-
penditure. Hence, if these targets reduce productive 
public investment, they may have a negative effect 
on long-term fiscal sustainability. This suggests that 
an indicator aimed at stabilizing the debt-to-public-
wealth ratio would be better than an indicator aimed 
at stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio.16 Of course, such 
indicator is not easy to calculate and would lead to 
transparency issues and this problem cannot be eas-
ily addressed by eliminating investment from fiscal 
targets because not all types of public investment 
projects have the potential of improving long-run 
solvency. However, research has shown that coun-
tries that have good capacities of conducting ex-ante 
evaluation of investment projects are able to select 
projects that may improve solvency over the long run 
(Easterly, Irwin and Serven, 2008). Fiscal targets that 
keep into account these ex-ante evaluations and also 
record revenues and expenses using accrual-based ac-
counting standards are likely to be superior to targets 
based on cash accounting.17 These considerations 
point to the fact that debt sustainability analysis needs 
to be framed into an asset-liability management ap-
proach and recognize that borrowing that increases 
the value of a country’s stock of assets is more likely 
to be sustainable than borrowing used to finance cur-
rent expenditures or white elephant projects.
B.  Additionality
Additionality of debt relief is one of the most 
important points raised by the Monterrey Consensus. 
The Consensus made it clear that debt relief should 
be “fully financed through additional resources” 
(§49). Interestingly, there is limited research on the 
additionality of debt relief. Four early papers (Ndi-
kumana, 2004; Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan, 2001; 
Powell, 2003; and Hepp, 2005) find inconclusive 
evidence. Arslanap and Henry (2006) claim that 
debt relief has not been additional and the World 
Bank (2006a) claims that debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative was not additional in the early years but has 
now become additional. The first four papers use a 
formal econometric analysis but are based on rather 
old data. The last two papers use more recent data 
but do not conduct a formal econometric analysis 
of the additionality of debt relief. The annex of this 
paper reports a set of econometric estimates based on 
recent data and shows that there is no strong evidence 
of additionality.
There are at least two definitions of additionality 
(Powell, 2003, uses three definitions). According to 
the first definition, debt relief is additional if it does 
not reduce other aid flows. According to the second 
definition, debt relief is additional if it increases the 
total resources made available to debtor countries. 
Satisfying the second definition of additionality is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for satisfying 
the first definition. Some algebra may be useful to 
clarify the two concepts. Define total aid as:
AID = NETAID + DR
Where AID is total aid, NETAID is AID net 
of debt relief, and DR is debt relief.18 We can use 
this equation to estimate the impact of debt relief on 
NETAID by using the following expression:
∆ΝΕΤAID = α∆DR
Where ∆NETAID is the change in aid net of 
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parameter α tells us by how much debt relief affects 
aid net of debt relief. In other words, α tells us by 
how much debt relief crowds-in or crowds-out other 
forms of aid. If α = 0, there is neither crowding-in 
nor crowding-out. This means that debt relief has no 
effect on other forms of aid. If α < 0 but α > −1, there 
is incomplete crowding out. This means that an extra 
dollar of debt relief leads to a reduction of other forms 
of aid but total aid (NETAID + DR) still increases 
(for instance, if α = −0.8, a one dollar increase in debt 
relief leads to a $0.8 decrease in other forms of aid 
but total aid increases by $0.2). If α < −1, there is full 
crowding out (an extra dollar of debt relief leads to a 
reduction in total aid). If α > 0, debt relief crowds-in 
other forms of aid. In this case, a one dollar increase 
in debt relief leads to an increase in total aid which 
is greater than one dollar. 
According to the first definition, aid is additional 
if an increase in DR does not lead to a decrease in 
NETAID. Hence, according to the first definition, aid 
is additional only if α is non-negative (i.e., α ≥ 0). 
According to the second definition, aid is additional 
if an increase in DR leads to an increase in AID 
(NETAID could go down, but debt relief would still 
be additional as long as the increase in DR is bigger 
than the decrease in NETAID). Hence, according to 
the second definition, aid is additional if α > −1.
In discussing additionality, I will adopt the first 
definition which is consistent with the Monterrey 
request that debt relief should be “fully financed 
through additional resources” and that donors need 
to ensure that “resources provided for debt relief do 
not detract from ODA resources.” 
Not only there are two concepts of additional-
ity, but additionality can be evaluated from both the 
donors and the recipients’ side. These are different 
concepts. Debt relief is additional from the donors’ 
side if debt relief does not reduce total ODA net of 
debt relief extended by each donor. Debt relief is 
additional from the recipients’ side if countries that 
receive more debt relief do not receive less ODA net 
of net relief. The two definitions can differ (and, in 
fact, they do).19 However, if debt relief is additional 
from the recipients’ side and it is not additional from 
the donors’ side, then, for any recipient of debt relief 
that receives constant (or increasing) ODA net of 
debt relief, there is a country that is not receiving 
debt relief and is also getting less ODA. So, in order 
to have full additionality, we need additionality from 
both the recipients and donors’ side. 
When we look at the problem from the donors’ 
side, we find that an extra dollar of debt relief leads 
to a reduction of net aid of approximately $0.3. 
Moreover, if we split donor countries into three 
groups: Stingy (those that give little aid), Generous 
(those that give a lot of aid), and Intermediate (all 
the other countries), we find that debt relief crowds 
out a lot of aid extended by generous countries (the 
point estimates of the regressions reported in table 
A1 are often lower than –1). This indicates that, for 
this group of countries, debt relief is not additional 
according to both the first and the second definition 
of additionality. For intermediate countries, we find a 
crowding out coefficient of approximately 40 per cent 
and for “stingy” countries we find positive (albeit not 
statistically significant) coefficients. This indicates 
that debt relief crowds-in aid only in countries that 
give little aid, but crowds-out aid in all other coun-
tries. My estimations show that things did not change 
after the implementation of the HIPC initiative. 
When I focus on the recipients’ side, I conduct 
two types of tests. First, I look at whether debt relief 
does liberate resources or just cancels debt in arrears 
and then I test additionality by using a set of regres-
sions similar to the ones used for donor countries. 
The first test suggests that more than 90 per 
cent of debt relief does indeed free resources. The 
coefficients of the arrears variables in table A2 range 
between 0.06 and 0.08. This is good news for debt re-
lief. However, the importance of arrears has increased 
with time climbing to 15–20 per cent in the post-1998 
period (table A3). Especially in recent years, arrears 
have been important for HIPCs, showing coefficients 
ranging between 14 and 40 per cent (table A4).20 
The second battery of tests (tables A5–A7) sug-
gests that debt relief is additional from the receivers’ 
side. The coefficients are often non-negative and in 
some cases even positive (suggesting that debt relief 
crowds-in aid). However, when I restrict the analysis 
to the HIPCs and focus on the recent years, I often 
find negative and statistically significant coefficients 
indicating a small crowding out of approximately 
6 per cent. 
Taken together the preliminary results discussed 
here present evidence that debt relief has not been 
fully additional.21 9 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
C.  New instruments and new institutions  22
There is now general agreement that debt struc-
ture is as important as the level of debt itself and that 
prudent fiscal policies are not enough to prevent the 
possibility of a debt crisis (Borensztein, Levy Yeyati 
and Panizza, 2006). In developing countries, debt 
structure is often biased towards foreign currency de-
nominated instruments, leading to a situation in which 
an adjustment of the real exchange rate has a large 
impact on the debt to GDP ratio.23 But real exchange 
rate volatility is not the only problem. Recessions, 
changes in commodity prices, financial contagion, 
and panic episodes can also turn around debt sustain-
ability indicators very quickly. As a result, developing 
countries tend to face lower credit ratings, higher in-
terest rates, and less stable financing even at levels of 
public indebtedness that are substantially lower than 
those of the advanced economies (figure 2). 
This creates an argument for introducing “safer” 
debt instruments. Examples of such instruments are 
local currency bonds and financial instruments with 
payments indexed to commodity prices, terms of 
trade, or GDP growth rate. Another option is to obtain 
contingent coverage through the use of derivative 
contracts. For instance, a commodity producer could 
reduce uncertainty by using future, forward, and op-
tion markets on the commodity. In practice, however, 
there are problems with this approach. Many future 
and option markets lack depth and liquidity and, 
therefore, offer only limited scope for insurance. The 
lack of markets is more acute in the case of events 
such as fluctuations in tourism revenues, and natu-
ral disasters such as hurricanes.24 The international 
community can help improving debt management by 
supporting the development of new markets and new 
instruments. Through this action, it will allow countries 
to minimize the risks of sovereign borrowing, keeping 
Figure 2
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costs of borrowing at moderate levels, and improve 
the cyclical timing of fiscal policy.
There is broad consensus on the desirability of 
issuing domestic-currency debt but few developing 
countries are able to issue external debt in their own 
currency. A factor limiting a country’s ability to issue 
external debt in its own currency is the small size of 
the market. While a few large emerging market coun-
tries may not be seriously affected, the currencies of 
many emerging markets are considered “exotic” and 
carry substantial liquidity premiums (Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza, 2005b). The international 
financial institutions (IFIs) could help broaden the 
investor base for local currency instruments by 
enlisting their own market liabilities. Several multi-
lateral development banks have been issuing bonds 
denominated in emerging economy currencies with 
the objective to minimize their own borrowing costs. 
Recently, they accelerated this process because they 
recognized that, by borrowing in local currencies, 
they could support the creation of markets for such 
instruments. Thus they would contribute to devel-
opment using both the assets (their loans) and the 
liabilities (their funding) of their balance sheets. An 
ambitious proposal along these lines is to create a 
synthetic unit of account that pools currency risk from 
a large and diversified group of emerging economies, 
together with steps for the international financial 
community to develop liquidity in this unit (Eichen-
green and Hausmann, 2005).25 Debt sustainability and 
risk-sharing can also be enhanced by issuing instru-
ments with equity-like features. GDP indexed bonds, 
which provide for lower payments when capacity to 
pay is low, are of particular interest.26 
However, creating a market in such securities 
poses a number of challenges. Someone has to sink 
the costs of designing the new instrument, and some-
one has to be the first to issue into a nonexistent or 
illiquid market. In the case of contingent bonds, the 
international community can provide technical assist-
ance on instrument design and expected pricing. In the 
case of GDP-linked debt, for example, the international 
community could strengthen the quality and reliability 
of statistics and thus enhance the credibility of these 
instruments. Moreover, the international community 
could help in the drafting of a model contract and 
resolve legal uncertainties (for example, questions 
about the legal standing of a GDP warrant relative to 
other sovereign instruments) and could provide guid-
ance on the drafting of GDP-linked clauses to ensure 
the reliability and integrity of their application.
The above discussion suggests that the creation 
of new instruments may require the intervention 
of the international community because of the 
required market size, externalities, and the need 
for homogenous standards. But the international 
community could also help addressing a more funda-
mental problem. Any policy aimed at lowering risk, 
either through derivative contracts or indexed debt, 
is analogous to paying an insurance premium and 
implies a cost that must be paid during good times. 
As these contracts are relatively complex, such costs 
can be easily misunderstood and become politically 
costly. This creates little incentive for politicians to 
enter into large scale contracts of this type. This is 
especially true for myopic politicians when consid-
ering that the cost is likely to be paid up front and 
the payoff from the insurance may accrue only years 
later. If the IFIs could create a critical mass of these 
instruments and demonstrate their benefits, it would 
be harder for myopic politicians to reject the use of 
such instruments. 
Even when countries are in a sound position in 
terms of debt sustainability, they may face liquid-
ity problems. Countries need to roll over maturing 
debt and cover their annual financing needs, which 
can become virtually impossible in the event of a 
sudden stop in global financial markets. Moreover, 
a liquidity crisis can trigger more fundamental in-
solvency problems by causing large exchange rate 
depreciation, recession, and/or bank failures. When 
debt is foreign-currency denominated, the accumu-
lation of a large stock of international reserves can 
protect a country from potential liquidity crises. 
But the accumulation of international reserves is 
expensive. Reserves are held in safe liquid assets 
(until recently, mostly United States Treasury Bonds) 
which carry low interest rates. For some emerging 
markets, the spread of their own debt over the yield 
on United States Treasury Bonds can be significant. 
Self-insurance thus entails a “cost of carry” that the 
government has to pay.27 Some authors have proposed 
ways of improving on this self-insurance strategy, 
for example by investing reserves in assets that are 
negatively correlated with country risk (as opposed 
to high-grade foreign currency assets, Rigobon, 2006; 
and Caballero and Panageas, 2006) or investing their 
reserves in assets which are less liquid than United 
States Treasury Bills but have a higher return. This 
is a sound strategy assuming that there exist assets 
or commodity derivatives with a reliable correlation 
with country risk and a sufficiently liquid market. The 
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where the volume of reserves amply exceeds what 
may be needed for ensuring stability in the foreign 
exchange market.28
To strengthen crisis prevention, the international 
community needs to implement plans to prevent or 
mitigate sudden hard currency liquidity shortages. A 
country insurance facility would consist of a liquidity 
window that lends short term to eligible countries at 
predetermined interest rates — in much the same way 
the central bank, acting as lender of last resort, lends 
to domestic financial institutions. Since rollover risk 
(i.e., uncertainty about access to sources of finance) 
is the main aspect driving liquidity runs, the avail-
ability of liquidity with certainty is a strong deterrent 
to the start of a self-fulfilling run. A commonly 
voiced concern with country insurance facilities is 
the potential for moral hazard. This aspect is critical 
because for a country insurance arrangement to be 
effective the availability of the funds needs to be 
reasonably automatic. The facility can avoid moral 
hazard by applying appropriate eligibility conditions, 
based on triggers that are exogenous to the assisted 
country (such as international interest rates or natural 
disasters), or a policy prequalification condition. A 
precedent in this regard is the Contingent Credit Lines 
(CCL) facility that the IMF implemented in 1999. 
Design problems made this facility unattractive to 
potential users and it was finally deactivated in 2003 
without having ever been drawn.29 
As a partial response to the liquidity risk, 
some emerging economies have started to develop 
regional country insurance schemes. These typically 
take the form of regional swap agreements under 
which participating countries can borrow from other 
members on short notice for limited periods of time. 
These agreements include the North American Swap 
Agreement, the Chiang Mai initiative, and the Latin 
American Reserve Fund (FLAR). While these ar-
rangements are close in spirit to a multilateral country 
insurance facility, their effectiveness is hampered by 
their limited (albeit growing) size and, in the Latin 
American case, by the absence of a large country with 
reliable access to dollar liquidity. Notwithstanding 
these problems, FLAR has been able to leverage its 
capital by funding itself in international markets at 
interest rates below those of its members. This im-
plies that this regional arrangement entails a lower 
insurance cost relative to what member countries 
would have to pay individually. The same is also 
observed in the rates paid by the Andean Financial 
Corporation (CAF), a regional development bank. 
This suggests that there may be efficiency gains 
associated with this type of arrangement, stemming 
from risk pooling or from the perception that they 
enjoy a preferred creditor status. 
Contagion has raised individual emerging 
market crises to regional or even global events in 
several past episodes. While a well implemented 
and fully credible country-insurance mechanism 
could eliminate contagion episodes, regulators and 
supervisors could also play a role by putting in place 
mechanisms to limit the damage caused by disorderly 
markets. Although it may not be feasible for an inter-
national institution to act as a global regulator, there 
are proposals that could provide circuit-breaker type 
benefits. For example, Calvo (2005) proposed the 
creation of an Emerging Market Fund (EMF) aimed 
at stabilizing an emerging market index such as the 
JP Morgan EMBI+. The Fund would be endowed 
with G3 debt instruments and, in the event of a dis-
turbance, could limit contagion by making a credible 
commitment to buy bonds from the emerging markets 
that are not at the centre of the crisis. The EMF could 
thus slow down or even stop a generalized collapse 
in the asset class, preventing fire sales from sending 
the wrong signal to investors. According to the original 
proposal, the EMF would not try to fight trends but only 
intervene in special circumstances. Action could only 
be triggered by a financial meltdown defined as a drop 
in the index by more than a certain percentage relative 
to a moving average. Calvo (2005) shows that creating 
such a Fund would require less than 1 per cent of G3 
countries’ public debt and could even be profitable, 
as long as the majority of the crises are indeed due to 
contagion and not deterioration of fundamentals. 12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
Iv.  conclusion: Where should we go 
next? A shadow consensus 
I conclude by discussing what should be the 
focus of the external debt component of the Doha 
conference. I will organize my “Shadow Consensus” 
into three sections: Background, Definitions and 
Actions. 
A.  Background: Should we care about 
external debt and if so why?
Until recently, the standard view in most de-
velopment and academic circles was that access to 
external resources was a necessary condition for 
igniting growth in poor countries. This view, which 
is consistent with the traditional developmental 
approach and modern neoclassic economic theory, 
was the main intellectual foundation of the Monter-
rey Consensus. However, empirical evidence has 
not been kind to this view. Over the last few years, 
several developing countries have been growing rap-
idly while running large current account surpluses. 
Econometric studies show that a reduced reliance 
on external capital (including both equity and debt 
flows) is linked to higher economic growth (Prasad, 
Rajan and Subramanian, 2007). As a consequence, 
the new orthodoxy is that external capital is at best 
not necessary and at worst detrimental for economic 
growth.
 
Does this mean that we need to forget every-
thing we learned about the potential positive effects 
of external resources? Maybe not! A fairer view 
of the new evidence is that external finance is not 
necessary for all countries or at all times. After all, 
econometric estimates can only tell us what happens 
in the average country. Hence, the finding that, on 
average, foreign capital is bad for growth does not 
rule out that some countries are actually benefiting 
from external resources. Moreover, there are differ-
ent types of inflows and each type has its costs and 
benefits. There are also different uses for such inflows 
and the effects of such inflows on the economy will 
depend on how these resources are used. Further-
more, the evidence shows that foreign capital does 
not contribute to economic growth under the current 
international set-up, but cannot say anything about 
what would happen under a revamped international 
financial architecture. 
A key challenge for a policy agenda on external 
debt is to identify which countries can benefit from 
external resources and how these resources can be 
used in order to maximize growth and social develop-
ment. However, this is not the only challenge. Even 
countries with positive net foreign assets have a gross 
external debt. In the presence of mismatches in the 
composition of gross external assets and liabilities 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001), gross external debt 
could still be a source of vulnerabilities. 
With respect to their external financing needs, 
developing countries can be divided into two groups: 
low income countries with limited or no market ac-
cess and middle income countries with market access 
(often referred to as emerging market countries). 
These two groups of countries face different prob-
lems and any consensus on what needs to be done 
on external debt should start by recognizing these 
differences. Most of the external funds that flow to 
the first group of countries consist of concessional 
loans, grants and aid. The main challenge for these 
countries is to obtain enough funds to finance their 
development needs. Of course, there are issues related 
to implementing safeguards so that money is not 
misspent or stolen. Moreover, donors need to make 
sure that aid flows do not cause distortions linked to 
Dutch-disease like phenomena and that investment 
projects financed with donors’ resources are part of 
a coherent growth strategy.30 However, international 
policies aimed guaranteeing debt sustainability in 
low-income countries often boil down to the Jerry 
Maguire approach: “Show me the money!”
The second group of countries, instead, can 
borrow in the international markets. In this case, the 
main challenge is to reduce the high volatility (often 
due to external factors but sometimes domestically 
generated) that characterizes private capital flows 
to these countries and implement policies aimed 
at reducing the costs of this volatility. Given that a 
large and increasing share of borrowing by emerging 
market countries originates within the private sec-
tor (table 1), these countries also need to carefully 
supervise the activities of private agents and ensure 
that private borrowing does not generate excessive 
vulnerabilities in the balance sheets of domestic 
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B.	 Definitions:	Boring	but	important
Before discussing what needs to be done about 
external debt, it is necessary to have a workable 
definition of external debt and ask whether it makes 
sense to talk about external debt without highlighting 
its interaction with domestic public debt.31 
 
When people talk about external debt, they have 
in mind three possible criteria for identifying this type 
of debt: (i) the currency in which the debt is issued 
(external debt is foreign currency debt); (ii) the resi-
dence of the creditor (external debt is debt owed to 
non-residents); and (iii) the place of issuance and the 
legislation that regulates the debt contract (external 
debt is debt issued in foreign countries and under the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court). 
The first definition does not seem appropriate 
because several countries issue foreign currency 
denominated debt in the domestic markets and have 
recently started to issue domestic currency denomi-
nated debt in international markets. Moreover, this 
definition is problematic for countries that adopt the 
currency of another country. This does not mean that 
countries should not report information on the curren-
cy composition of their domestic and external debt. 
In fact, such information is necessary for evaluating 
a country’s vulnerability to currency mismatches 
and potential responses to a debt crisis. However, 
currency composition should not be confused with 
the definition of external debt. 
The second definition is the one which is of-
ficially adopted by the main compilers of statistical 
information on public debt. The External Debt Statis-
tics: Guide for Compilers and Users jointly published 
by the BIS, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, Paris Club, 
UNCTAD and the World Bank states that: “Gross 
external debt, at any given time, is the outstanding 
amount of those actual current, and not contingent, 
liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or 
interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future 
and that are owed to non-residents by residents of an 
economy.” This definition makes sense from a theo-
retical point of view because it focuses on the transfer 
of resources between residents and non-residents. It 
allows to measure the amount of international risk 
sharing and the income effects of variations in the 
stock of debt, and to evaluate the political cost of a de-
fault on public debt. However, this definition is almost 
impossible to apply in the current environment where 
most external debt due to private creditors takes the 
form of bonds (things were easier when most lending 
was channelled through syndicated bank loans). Of 
course, countries could try to identify the residence 
of whoever bought the bonds in the primary market 
and track what happens in the secondary market by 
running periodical surveys. However, few develop-
ing countries are attempting (or have the capacity) to 
identify the ultimate holders of their bonds.32 Even 
those that try to do so cannot do anything for bonds 
held in offshore financial centres. As a consequence, 
most countries end up reporting figures for external 
and domestic debt by using information on the place 
of issuance and the jurisdiction that regulates the debt 
contract. This is not a problem, per se. The problem 
is that the information is misleading because it does 
not measure what it promises to do (i.e., transfer of 
resources from non-residents to residents).33 
This discussion would be irrelevant if there were 
a close match between the place of issuance and the 
residency of the ultimate holder, as it used to be the 
case in the past. However, there is anecdotal evidence 
that more and more international investors are enter-
ing the domestic markets of developing countries 
and that domestic investors often hold bonds issued 
in international markets. For instance, a large share 
of domestic long-term debt issued by the Mexican 
government is held by the United States investors 
and, at the time of the Argentinean debt default, a 
significant share of Argentinean “external” bonds 
were held by residents.
As a consequence, I tend to prefer the third 
definition which classifies as external all debt is-
sued under foreign law (this is the definition used 
in Cowan, Levy Yeyati, Panizza and Sturzenegger, 
2006). While I am aware that the second definition 
is the one which is theoretically correct, a definition 
based on jurisdiction is feasible and does not give 
misleading information on the identity of the sup-
posed holders of a country’s debt. 
In an environment characterized by open capital 
accounts and by the presence of foreign investors 
who buy domestically issued debt and domestic 
investors who buy debt issued in the international 
market, the old external/domestic debt dichotomy 
does not make much sense. Legislation, residence 
and type of holders, currency, and maturity are all 
characteristics which are associated with different 
types of vulnerabilities. Yet, excessive focus on the 
external/domestic breakdown led to a situation in 
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domestically issued debt is not usually included 
among the vulnerability indicators used to predict 
financial crises. 
C.  Summing up: What is to be done?
The policy agenda on the “external” debt of 
developing countries should focus on the following 
seven points:34 
  (i)  Recognize that not all countries need the same 
amount of external resources or are able to 
sustain the same amount of debt, and that debt 
sustainability depends on how debt is used. 
Emphasize that the ability to repay debt (which 
is at the core of standard debt sustainability 
analysis exercises) is different from the need 
for external resources. There are countries that 
face an unsustainable debt situation and need 
more resources. Likewise, there are countries 
that do not have problems sustaining a higher 
level of debt, but are in a situation in which a net 
flow of external resources could be deleterious 
for economic and social development (which 
could generate sustainability problems in the 
long-run). Identifying these different groups of 
countries should be the objective of a revamped 
Debt Sustainability Framework. In this vein, it 
should be recognized that debt sustainability 
analysis exercises should focus on both assets 
and liabilities. 
 (ii)  Recognize that debt sustainability is an issue for 
both low income and middle income countries 
and that debt relief efforts should not, in princi-
ple, discriminate among these different groups 
of countries. As countries that need debt relief 
are also likely to need more external resources, 
the official sector should make sure that debt 
relief is truly additional, and could possibly be 
accompanied by an increase in other forms of 
aid. Evaluation of debt relief initiatives should 
include an explicit measure of the additionality 
of debt relief. 
  (iii)  Recognize that past debt relief efforts have 
been somewhat unfair to countries with large 
developmental needs but low debt levels and 
ensure that these countries are appropriately re-
warded for conducting prudent macroeconomic 
policies. A way to accomplish this would be to 
include all low-income countries in the Multi-
lateral Debt Relief Initiative. 
 (iv)  Recognize that financial crises in countries with 
market access are often driven by liquidity 
problems and not by solvency problems – even 
solvency problems are sometimes the outcome 
of a liquidity problem. Help developing coun-
tries create new instruments and institutions that 
can reduce the likelihood of a liquidity crisis. 
Acknowledge that international coordination 
is particularly important because some of the 
shocks that may lead to a liquidity crisis depend 
on external factors and that these shocks often 
originate from policy decisions of the advanced 
economies.
 (v)  Recognize that vulnerabilities which may lead 
to debt crises are related to both debt levels and 
debt composition, and that there are important 
interactions between domestic public debt and 
external debt. As vulnerabilities cannot be iden-
tified without prompt and reliable data on the 
composition of both external debt and domestic 
public debt, encourage international coordina-
tion aimed at producing and disseminating such 
data. Donors should support programmes aimed 
at improving the debt management and data 
collection capacities of developing countries 
and ensure that the various competing systems 
report comparable data and cover domestic 
public debt. The international dialogue should 
move from “External Debt” to “External Debt 
and Total Public Debt.” 
 (vi)  Recognize that, even with improved debt man-
agement and better and safer debt instruments, 
debt crises are bound to occur and that the lack 
of a mechanism for recognizing a situation of in-
solvency in the early stages of a debt crisis may 
lead to costly delays in the restructuring proc-
ess.35 It is thus unfortunate that the discussion 
on the possibility of creating a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanisms, which had built mo-
mentum in the run-up of the Argentinean crisis, 
is no longer salient in political discussions. The 
international community should not abandon the 
idea of creating a debt resolution mechanism 
aimed at guaranteeing a speedy solution to debt 
crises and a fair burden-sharing among creditors 
and debtors. In fact, there should be two crisis 
resolution mechanisms: one for middle income 
countries with a large share of commercial debt 
and one for low income countries which have 
a large share of their debt with official credi-
tors. 15 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
  (vii) Start thinking seriously about the odious debt 
issue. This is a controversial concept on which 
there is a multiplicity of views. Some argue that 
odiousness should be defined ex-post (Eurodad, 
2007), while others argue that declaring odious-
ness ex-post may generate some problems that 
could be solved by declaring odiousness ex-ante 
(Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006). Still others 
claim that, given the current state of knowledge, 
having an explicit odious debt policy either ex-
post or ex-ante may do more harm than good 
(Rajan, 2004). While the new consensus should 
not take a position on an exclusive definition 
of odious debt, it should promote the creation 
of an intergovernmental forum for discussing 
issues related to odious and illegitimate debt. 
The lack of such a forum has led to a situa-
tion in which the debate is often dominated by 
participants with extreme views and in which 
there is no way to separate, and give legitimacy 
to, reasonable and feasible definitions of odious 
and illegitimate debt from more radical views.
Statistical annex: Is debt relief 
additional?  36
 This annex presents some preliminary results 
of a statistical exercise aimed at testing whether debt 
relief brings additional resources or crowds out other 
forms of official development assistance. These sta-
tistical tests measure additionality from the point of 
view of both donors and recipients.
 
Additionality from the donors’ perspective
 
We start by testing whether donors who grant 
debt relief give less non-debt relief-related aid. We 
do this by estimating the following regression:
ODANETi,t = αDRi,t + βXi,t + µi + εi,t
Where ODANET is official development as-
sistance net of debt relief extended by country i in 
year t, DR is debt relief offered by country i in year 
t (both ODANET and DR are measured as a share of 
GDP of the donor country), X is a matrix of control 
variables, and µi is a country fixed-effect that controls 
for all possible donor-specific time-invariant country 
characteristics (we will also estimate some specifica-
tions with random effects and some specifications 
with time fixed effects).37 We estimate the model 
using data for 21 countries which are members of 
the OECD-DAC and use DAC data to measure ODA 
and Debt Relief.38 
Our parameter of interest is α. This parameter 
measures the relationship between debt relief and 
non-debt relief ODA. If we were to find that α is 
equal to zero, then we could conclude that there is no 
relationship between debt relief and ODANET and 
that debt relief is additional. A positive value of α 
indicates that debt relief crowds in aid. This situation, 
in which debt relief is more than additional, would 
suggest that donors realize that some countries need 
both debt relief and more resources. A negative value 
of α indicates that debt relief crowds out aid and that 
debt relief is not fully additional.39
The results of our model show that debt relief 
is not fully additional. In particular, columns 1–4 of 
table A1 show that each dollar of debt relief crowds 
out about 30 cents of non-debt relief related ODA.40 
In columns 5–10, we split the sample into three 
groups of countries: Stingy, Intermediate and Gen-
erous.41 We find no crowding out for stingy countries 
(probably because they give so little that they could 
hardly reduce their net ODA). In fact, for these 
countries the interaction term (ST*DR) is positive 
(albeit not statistically significant) indicating that, if 
anything, debt relief crowds-in other forms of ODA. 
For intermediate countries (INTER*DR), we find a 
crowding out effect of approximately 40 per cent 
(one dollar of debt relief crowds out 40 cents of other 
forms of ODA). For generous countries (GEN*DR) 
we find that debt relief crowds out 100 per cent of 
other forms of ODA. 
The second part of table A1 focuses on the post-
HIPC years (starting in 1998) and shows that the 
HIPC initiative did not change things substantially. 
Additionality from the recipients’ perspective
We look at additionality from the recipient’s 
perspective by conducting two experiments. First, 
we test whether debt relief does consists of cancel-
lation of performing debt or if it is just an accounting 
exercise in which creditors officially recognize that 
their claims have no value (Depetris and Kraay, 2007, 
present a detailed discussion of this issue). Then, we 
conduct an exercise similar to that conducted in the 
previous section and test the relationship between 
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  For the first exercise we estimate the follow-
ing model:
DRi,t = αARRi,t-1 + βXi,t + µi + εi,t
Where DR is debt relief received by country i in 
year t, ARR are the arrears on debt accumulated by 
country i in year t-1 (we measure DR and ARR as a 
share of debt and as a share of GDP of the recipient 
country), X is a matrix of control variables, and µi is 
a country fixed-effect that controls for all possible 
recipient-specific time-invariant country character-
istics (we also estimate some specifications with 
time fixed effects).42 We estimate the model using an 
unbalanced panel of up to 114 developing countries. 
We obtain data on arrears and debt relief from the 
World Bank’s Global Development Finance Database 
(we define debt relief as the sum of principal forgiven 
and interests forgiven, we obtain the same results if 
we add debt rescheduling). 
Again, our parameter of interest is α. This pa-
rameter measures the relationship between arrears 
Table A1
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DONOR’S ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF AS A ShARE OF DONOR’S GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y -0.297 -0.267 -0.293 -0.267
(2.06)** (1.79)* (2.05)** (1.80)*
Ln(GDPPC) 1.447 4.630 1.399 4.715 1.238 3.738 1.486 4.825 1.306 4.516
(3.52)*** (6.28)*** (3.38)*** (6.16)*** (3.11)*** (5.36)*** (3.61)*** (6.32)*** (3.46)*** (6.49)***
RER 0.118 0.058 0.117 0.057 0.137 0.083 0.131 0.071 0.084 0.079
(1.66)* (0.78) (1.67)* (0.77) (1.94)* (1.11) (1.86)* (0.95) (1.73)* (1.11)
GOVBAL -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(4.27)*** (4.58)*** (4.57)*** (4.89)*** (4.42)*** (4.65)*** (4.70)*** (4.95)*** (6.09)*** (5.97)***
HIPC -0.015 -0.012 -0.010 -0.016
(0.92) (0.70) (0.64) (0.96)
ST*DR 0.089 0.070 0.073 0.094 0.008 -0.037
(0.38) (0.29) (0.31) (0.40) (0.03) (0.22)
GEN*DR -1.199 -0.838 -1.379 -0.965 -1.720 -1.482
(2.01)** (1.43) (2.28)** (1.65)* (3.98)*** (2.63)***
INTER*DR -0.369 -0.390 -0.413 -0.410 -0.244 -0.531





Constant -2.967 -10.204 -2.862 -10.407 -2.734 -8.439 -3.057 -10.656 -2.760 -10.044
(3.14)*** (6.06)*** (3.01)*** (5.96)*** (2.97)*** (5.27)*** (3.23)*** (6.11)*** (3.17)*** (6.28)***
N. obs. 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
N. countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Estimation 




  effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses.  
Table A1 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DONOR’S ODA NET OF 
DEbT RElIEF AS A ShARE OF DONOR’S GDP 
(Only HIPC years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DR/Y -0.231 -0.284 -0.215 -0.278
(1.88)* (2.13)** (1.77)* (2.09)**
Ln(GDPPC) 1.550 2.077 1.423 1.297
(3.50)*** (1.74)* (3.20)*** (0.98)
RER 0.033 0.044 0.039 0.059
(0.41) (0.48) (0.49) (0.63)
GOVBAL -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008
(2.12)** (2.57)** (2.57)** (2.94)***
Constant -3.227 -4.442 -2.931 -2.636
(3.12)*** (1.60) (2.83)*** (0.86)
N. obs. 166 166 166 166
N. countries 21 21 21 21
Estimation
  method Random effects Fixed effects
Year fixed 
  effects No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; 
  *** significant at 1 per cent. 
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and debt relief. Table A2 suggests that about 6–7 per 
cent of debt relief is just the recognition of arrears.43 
Moreover, the presence of arrears is the only variable 
that is robustly correlated with debt relief. Table A3 
splits the sample in the pre and post-HIPC period and 
finds that things got worse after the HIPC initiative. 
After 1998, about 15 per cent of debt relief is just the 
recognition of arrears. Table A4 restricts the sample 
to HIPC countries. In this case, arrears represent up 
to 20 per cent of debt relief! So, the HIPC initiative 
seems to have made things worse and not better. 
World Bank (2006a) claims that debt relief under 
HIPC was not additional in the early periods but that 
debt relief has become additional after 2001. We test 
this hypothesis in the second part of table A4 and find 
that when we restrict the sample to the post-2000 
period, the coefficients attached to arrears increase 
to 40 per cent. This result is not consistent with an 
increase in additionality. If anything, it suggests that 
debt relief is less additional than it was before.
For our second experiment, we estimate the 
following model.
ODANETi,t = αDRi,t + βXi,t + µi + εi,t
This model is exactly the same as the one used to 
measure additionality from the donors’ point of view. 
The only differences are that all variables are now 
measured from the recipients’ side and that the set 
of controls in the matrix X is different.44 The results 
obtained by estimating the two equations may differ 
for two reasons: the unit of analysis is different and 
developing countries receive ODA from non-DAC 
donors and from the multilaterals. 
The results reported in table A5 show that all 
coefficients are positive but rarely statistically sig-
nificant. This is consistent with full additionality but 
no crowding-in effect. The second part of table A5 
controls for outliers and find both additionality and 
Table A2
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES 
(Fixed effects estimates) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Debt relief as a share of PPG external debt Debt relief as a share of GDP
ARR/D t-1 0.061 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.065
(6.16)*** (6.08)*** (5.92)*** (5.98)*** (5.80)***
PPG/Y t-1 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.005
(0.22) (0.15) (1.02) (1.15)
Ln(GDPPC) -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.000
(1.18) (0.99) (1.16) (0.91) (0.53) (0.15) (0.45) (0.01)
SEAT UN SC -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.49) (0.43) (0.40) (0.32) (1.30) (1.26) (0.90) (0.87)
INST 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.48) (0.47) (0.51) (0.49) (0.45) (0.37) (0.19) (0.12)
Ln(POP) 0.021 0.033 0.020 0.034 0.022 0.040 0.020 0.042
(1.34) (1.18) (1.24) (1.12) (1.52) (1.59) (1.34) (1.57)
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.001 0.001 -0.014 -0.015
(0.19) (0.23) (2.45)** (2.56)**
ARR/Y t-1 0.055 0.059 0.059 0.077 0.078
(9.56)*** (7.09)*** (7.06)*** (7.27)*** (7.26)***
Constant 0.002 -0.113 -0.229 -0.105 -0.237 0.002 -0.155 -0.344 -0.140 -0.367
(1.02) (0.82) (0.82) (0.74) (0.81) (1.71)* (1.26) (1.39) (1.12) (1.42)
N. obs. 1586 1459 1459 1425 1425 1585 1459 1459 1424 1424
N. countries 114 111 111 111 111 114 111 111 111 111
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
crowing in of about 8–9 per cent indicating that a $1 
of debt relief brings in $0.09 of additional non-debt 
relief related resources. Table A6 splits the sample 
into periods and shows that debt relief was not ad-
ditional in the pre-HIPC period (crowding out was 
about 25 per cent) but has become additional in the 
HIPC period. Table A7 restricts the sample to HIPC 
countries and again, finds evidence of additionality. 
However, when we control for outliers (second panel 
of table A7) and control for arrears (remember coun-
tries with arrears get more debt relief), we find some 
evidence of crowding out (at about 5 per cent, the 
value is small). The last two panels of table A7 look 
at HIPC countries for the post-2000 period (World 
Bank, 2006, claims that debt relief has become ad-
ditional in this period) and find that, if anything 
additionality has decreased. 
Summing up, we find strong evidence of no ad-
ditionality from the donors’ side and some evidence 
of additionality from the recipient side. If we accept 
that full additionality requires additionality form both 
side, then we conclude that, so far, debt relief has not 
been fully additional. 
Table A3
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debt relief as a share of PPG external debt Debt relief as a share of GDP
ARR/D t-1 0.032 0.140 0.034 0.133
(1.55) (7.28)*** (1.64) (6.56)***
PPG/Y t-1 -0.018 0.016 -0.034 -0.011
(2.58)** (1.51) (4.03)*** (1.02)
Ln(GDPPC) 0.016 0.001 0.021 -0.000 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.004
(0.60) (0.05) (0.80) (0.02) (0.37) (0.40) (0.11) (0.29)
SEAT UN SC -0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(0.55) (0.12) (0.59) (0.13) (0.38) (0.07) (0.41) (0.09)
INST -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(1.33) (0.05) (1.30) (0.04) (0.14) (1.08) (0.45) (1.02)
Ln(POP) -0.042 0.068 -0.049 0.078 -0.032 0.105 -0.034 0.099
(0.85) (1.99)** (0.98) (2.25)** (0.81) (3.04)*** (0.83) (2.86)***
NPVPPG/Y t-1 -0.016 0.018 -0.044 -0.024
(2.39)** (1.61) (4.26)*** (1.82)*
ARR/Y t-1 0.058 0.164 0.082 0.178
(3.82)*** (10.81)*** (4.27)*** (9.89)***
Constant 0.286 -0.634 0.300 -0.717 0.375 -0.984 0.338 -0.915
(0.66) (2.15)** (0.70) (2.36)** (1.08) (3.30)*** (0.97) (3.03)***
N. obs. 615 844 588 837 615 844 587 837
N. countries 104 111 101 111 104 111 101 111
R2 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15
Period 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses.19 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
Table A4
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates; only HIPCs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Debt relief as a share of PPG external debt Debt relief as a share of GDP
ARR/D t-1 0.185 0.209 0.204 0.205 0.201
(5.11)*** (5.05)*** (4.84)*** (4.46)*** (4.28)***
PPG/Y t-1 0.015 0.017 -0.016 -0.012
(0.71) (0.74) (0.65) (0.46)
Ln(GDPPC) -0.017 -0.027 -0.027 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 -0.044 -0.049
(0.25) (0.38) (0.41) (0.58) (0.54) (0.53) (0.60) (0.65)
SEAT UN SC -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 -0.037 -0.040 -0.037 -0.040
(0.63) (0.66) (0.61) (0.62) (1.18) (1.26) (1.20) (1.28)
INST -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.14) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.82) (0.48) (0.78) (0.44)
Ln(POP) 0.111 -0.066 0.123 -0.042 0.186 -0.007 0.176 0.009
(1.62) (0.35) (1.76)* (0.22) (2.38)** (0.03) (2.30)** (0.04)
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.009 0.007 -0.036 -0.042
(0.39) (0.29) (1.10) (1.20)
ARR/Y t-1 0.135 0.163 0.157 0.185 0.185
(5.92)*** (5.59)*** (5.26)*** (4.90)*** (4.75)***
Constant -0.014 -0.917 0.766 -0.936 0.650 -0.008 -1.365 0.379 -1.248 0.316
(1.89)* (1.42) (0.43) (1.38) (0.36) (1.31) (1.91)* (0.19) (1.69)* (0.16)
N. obs. 277 248 248 246 246 276 248 248 246 246
N. countries 31 30 30 30 30 31 30 30 30 30
R2 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses.
Table A4 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates; only HIPCs after 2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Debt relief as a share of PPG external debt Debt relief as a share of GDP
ARR/D t-1 0.387 0.408 0.403 0.393 0.394
(11.14)*** (10.64)*** (10.25)*** (8.57)*** (7.42)***
PPG/Y t-1 0.040 0.038 0.005 0.002
(1.30) (1.12) (0.14) (0.06)
Ln(GDPPC) 0.110 0.083 0.063 0.045 0.108 0.082 0.097 0.079
(0.83) (0.60) (0.50) (0.33) (0.76) (0.55) (0.72) (0.55)
SEAT UN SC -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.001
(0.04) (0.12) (0.10) (0.23) (0.14) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02)
INST 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.21) (0.35) (0.06) (0.13) (0.44) (0.28) (0.51) (0.43)
Ln(POP) -0.013 -0.080 0.068 0.061 0.010 -0.082 0.009 -0.041
(0.08) (0.21) (0.45) (0.17) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.11)
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.018 0.011 -0.009 -0.021
(0.52) (0.26) (0.22) (0.43)
ARR/Y t-1 0.362 0.390 0.388 0.395 0.400
(16.57)*** (14.94)*** (14.51)*** (12.14)*** (10.73)***
Constant -0.041 -0.765 0.033 -1.128 -0.935 -0.042 -0.894 0.129 -0.804 -0.203
(6.43)*** (0.69) (0.01) (0.92) (0.27) (8.47)*** (0.74) (0.03) (0.62) (0.06)
N. obs. 132 104 104 104 104 132 104 104 104 104
N. countries 28 27 27 27 27 28 27 27 27 27
R2 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 20 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
Table A5
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES 
(Fixed effects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.128 0.024 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.077 0.008 0.017 0.007 0.011
(2.69)*** (0.58) (0.73) (0.67) (0.70) (1.74)* (0.19) (0.41) (0.17) (0.27)
PPG/Y t-1 0.026 0.024 0.037 0.033
(6.93)*** (6.43)*** (7.18)*** (6.51)***
Ln(GDPPC) -0.100 -0.118 -0.107 -0.126 -0.099 -0.117 -0.106 -0.124
(11.30)*** (12.80)*** (12.03)*** (13.56)*** (11.18)*** (12.69)*** (11.95)*** (13.45)***
SEAT UN SC 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017
(3.66)*** (3.50)*** (3.39)*** (3.19)*** (3.72)*** (3.54)*** (3.40)*** (3.20)***
INST 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(4.05)*** (3.50)*** (4.06)*** (3.43)*** (3.83)*** (3.33)*** (3.66)*** (3.08)***
Ln(POP) -0.064 -0.196 -0.057 -0.190 -0.068 -0.199 -0.060 -0.192
(4.04)*** (5.96)*** (3.51)*** (5.61)*** (4.28)*** (6.08)*** (3.73)*** (5.69)***
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.022 0.021 0.045 0.041
(5.74)*** (5.48)*** (6.89)*** (6.44)***
ARR/Y t-1 0.038 -0.028 -0.024 -0.051 -0.047
(5.22)*** (3.02)*** (2.61)*** (4.35)*** (4.01)***
Constant 0.078 1.394 2.696 1.397 2.728 0.067 1.416 2.717 1.413 2.713
(52.29)*** (10.44)*** (8.74)*** (10.25)*** (8.58)*** (44.39)*** (10.63)*** (8.83)*** (10.41)*** (8.59)***
N. obs. 1545 1333 1333 1309 1309 1451 1333 1333 1305 1305
N. countries 106 103 103 103 103 106 103 103 103 103
R2 0.01 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.02 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 
Table A5 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES 
(Fixed effects estimates, controlling for outliers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.079 0.084 0.087 0.091 0.092 0.095 0.078 0.079 0.084 0.085
(7.29)*** (8.01)*** (8.24)*** (8.87)*** (8.64)*** (8.87)*** (7.29)*** (7.42)*** (8.06)*** (7.90)***
PPG/Y t-1 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.013
(10.35)*** (12.01)*** (9.55)*** (9.96)***
Ln(GDPPC) -0.017 -0.007 -0.015 -0.009 -0.017 -0.011 -0.017 -0.012
(7.31)*** (2.84)*** (6.67)*** (3.55)*** (7.41)*** (4.31)*** (7.58)*** (5.00)***
SEAT UN SC 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.15) (0.09) (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.25) (0.04)
INST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.92)*** (4.21)*** (3.83)*** (4.94)*** (3.25)*** (4.19)*** (4.19)*** (4.91)***
Ln(POP) -0.042 0.013 -0.046 0.012 -0.042 0.006 -0.046 0.004
(10.43)*** (1.50) (11.48)*** (1.32) (10.17)*** (0.68) (11.27)*** (0.43)
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.011
(7.66)*** (9.14)*** (6.18)*** (6.65)***
ARR/Y t-1 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
(5.94)*** (2.92)*** (2.72)*** (2.62)*** (2.41)**
Constant 0.002 0.488 -0.110 0.485 0.141 0.005 0.716 0.014 0.767 0.247
(0.20) (22.08)*** (0.91) (21.59)*** (2.70)*** (0.56) (13.48)*** (0.11) (14.70)*** (5.18)***
N. obs. 1545 1333 1331 1308 1308 1451 1332 1331 1305 1303
N. countries 106 103 103 103 103 106 103 103 103 103
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 21 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
Table A6
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES 
(Fixed effects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DR/Y -0.247 0.061 -0.263 0.082 -0.260 0.034 -0.238 0.057
(2.43)** (1.93)* (2.43)** (2.47)** (2.49)** (0.96) (2.12)** (1.62)
PPG/Y t-1 0.023 0.042 0.018 0.048
(3.24)*** (5.38)*** (1.69)* (5.71)***
Ln(GDPPC) -0.202 -0.055 -0.204 -0.063 -0.204 -0.054 -0.201 -0.063
(7.47)*** (4.31)*** (7.53)*** (4.88)*** (7.47)*** (4.30)*** (7.33)*** (4.82)***
SEAT UN SC 0.034 0.000 0.035 -0.000 0.034 0.000 0.034 -0.000
(3.63)*** (0.01) (3.65)*** (0.05) (3.65)*** (0.03) (3.62)*** (0.02)
INST 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001
(2.31)** (0.62) (2.36)** (0.72) (2.32)** (0.68) (2.29)** (0.74)
Ln(POP) -0.218 0.146 -0.226 0.173 -0.220 0.134 -0.221 0.164
(4.39)*** (5.57)*** (4.49)*** (6.37)*** (4.42)*** (4.96)*** (4.35)*** (6.00)***
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.025 0.027 0.035 0.040
(3.69)*** (3.17)*** (2.59)*** (3.80)***
ARR/Y t-1 0.012 -0.024 -0.021 -0.031
(0.59) (1.89)* (0.83) (2.09)**
Constant 3.574 -0.840 3.672 -1.001 3.615 -0.735 3.602 -0.933
(8.45)*** (3.85)*** (8.57)*** (4.36)*** (8.43)*** (3.27)*** (8.26)*** (4.04)***
N. obs. 565 768 547 762 565 768 543 762
N. countries 95 103 92 103 95 103 92 103
R2 0.25 0.12 0.26 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.26 0.10
Period 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006 1990–1997 1998–2006
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
Table A7
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES 
(Fixed effects estimates; the sample only includes HIPCs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.116 0.030 0.021 0.067 0.062 0.069 -0.008 -0.014 0.023 0.022
(1.68)* (0.57) (0.39) (1.22) (1.11) (1.09) (0.15) (0.25) (0.40) (0.37)
PPG/Y t-1 0.070 0.070 0.081 0.081
(4.40)*** (4.24)*** (4.71)*** (4.50)***
Ln(GDPPC) -0.027 -0.028 -0.062 -0.063 -0.023 -0.023 -0.049 -0.050
(0.54) (0.54) (1.23) (1.23) (0.46) (0.44) (0.97) (0.99)
SEAT UN SC 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028
(1.11) (1.13) (1.16) (1.23) (1.17) (1.16) (1.27) (1.32)
INST 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
(2.48)** (2.19)** (2.35)** (2.04)** (2.56)** (2.28)** (2.38)** (2.09)**
Ln(POP) 0.239 0.309 0.299 0.397 0.215 0.280 0.278 0.352
(4.72)*** (2.22)** (5.71)*** (2.82)*** (4.10)*** (2.00)** (5.31)*** (2.51)**
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.053 0.056 0.092 0.096
(3.22)*** (3.20)*** (4.17)*** (4.10)***
ARR/Y t-1 -0.009 -0.036 -0.033 -0.070 -0.069
(0.44) (1.66)* (1.50) (2.60)*** (2.52)**
Constant 0.149 -1.944 -2.578 -2.207 -3.083 0.141 -1.761 -2.359 -2.124 -2.782
(36.60)*** (4.13)*** (1.97)* (4.34)*** (2.31)** (23.68)*** (3.66)*** (1.79)* (4.22)*** (2.10)**
N. obs. 310 248 248 246 246 276 248 248 246 246
N. countries 31 30 30 30 30 31 30 30 30 30
R2 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.01 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.25
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 
Table A7 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates, controlling for outliers; only HIPCs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.091 0.076 0.072 0.104 0.081 0.044 -0.056 -0.053 -0.024 -0.033
(2.96)*** (2.66)*** (2.44)** (3.48)*** (2.54)** (1.34) (1.75)* (1.77)* (0.74) (1.03)
PPG/Y t-1 0.034 0.017 0.062 0.050
(4.62)*** (2.15)** (7.23)*** (5.97)***
Ln(GDPPC) 0.012 -0.018 0.011 -0.023 -0.091 -0.080 -0.099 -0.094
(0.47) (0.69) (0.43) (0.86) (3.41)*** (3.17)*** (3.68)*** (3.65)***
SEAT UN SC -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006
(1.15) (0.91) (1.12) (0.86) (0.83) (0.66) (0.80) (0.57)
INST 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.70)* (0.83) (1.69)* (0.60) (1.61) (0.84) (1.35) (0.49)
Ln(POP) 0.013 0.225 0.026 0.233 0.113 0.313 0.147 0.352
(0.55) (3.40)*** (1.03) (3.47)*** (4.29)*** (4.88)*** (5.52)*** (5.42)***
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.033 0.010 0.071 0.064
(4.37)*** (1.15) (6.40)*** (5.78)***
ARR/Y t-1 -0.043 -0.088 -0.082 -0.115 -0.110
(4.58)*** (7.84)*** (7.81)*** (7.85)*** (7.83)***
Constant 0.095 -0.141 -1.757 -0.224 -1.784 0.097 -0.377 -2.162 -0.591 -2.388
(10.43)*** (0.62) (2.95)*** (0.94) (2.91)*** (10.36)*** (1.55) (3.75)*** (2.34)** (4.05)***
N. obs. 310 276 276 272 272 304 276 276 272 272
N. countries 31 30 30 30 30 31 30 30 30 30
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 23 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
Table A7 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates; only HIPCs after 2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.046 -0.028 -0.042 0.033 0.038 0.021 -0.011 -0.030 0.027 0.027
(0.81) (0.67) (1.02) (0.74) (0.86) (0.37) (0.24) (0.66) (0.59) (0.60)
PPG/Y t-1 0.080 0.105 0.077 0.101
(2.58)** (3.18)*** (2.44)** (3.02)***
Ln(GDPPC) -0.059 -0.138 -0.085 -0.177 -0.043 -0.125 -0.090 -0.199
(0.44) (1.04) (0.67) (1.38) (0.32) (0.93) (0.70) (1.55)
SEAT UN SC 0.002 0.016 0.009 0.024 0.002 0.016 0.008 0.024
(0.06) (0.47) (0.26) (0.73) (0.07) (0.47) (0.25) (0.73)
INST 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.013
(0.74) (1.56) (0.96) (1.78)* (0.82) (1.58) (0.96) (1.97)*
Ln(POP) -0.005 -0.978 0.243 -0.599 0.017 -0.939 0.244 -0.690
(0.03) (2.71)*** (1.60) (1.82)* (0.10) (2.55)** (1.60) (2.06)**
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.094 0.117 0.104 0.156
(3.03)*** (3.41)*** (2.80)*** (3.50)***
ARR/Y t-1 0.042 0.024 0.016 -0.015 -0.045
(1.37) (0.87) (0.61) (0.47) (1.35)
Constant 0.159 0.514 9.910 -1.540 6.764 0.152 0.199 9.464 -1.526 7.726
(38.66)*** (0.46) (2.96)*** (1.23) (2.14)** (20.60)*** (0.17) (2.75)*** (1.22) (2.40)**
N. obs. 161 104 104 104 104 132 104 104 104 104
N. countries 29 27 27 27 27 28 27 27 27 27
R2 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.25
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 
Table A7 (cont.)
DEPENDENT vARIAblE: ODA NET OF DEbT RElIEF REcEIvED bY REcIPIENT cOUNTRIES
(Fixed effects estimates, controlling for outliers; only HIPCs after 2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DR/Y 0.134 -0.067 -0.073 -0.041 0.165 -0.045 -0.060 -0.069 0.055 0.155
(4.55)*** (2.23)** (2.22)** (1.38) (4.84)*** (1.41) (1.88)* (1.98)* (1.94)* (4.77)***
PPG/Y t-1 0.033 0.058 0.063 0.068
(1.88)* (2.89)*** (3.57)*** (3.39)***
Ln(GDPPC) 0.012 -0.098 0.001 -0.205 0.065 -0.042 0.031 -0.230
(0.18) (1.37) (0.02) (3.11)*** (1.05) (0.63) (0.57) (3.73)***
SEAT UN SC -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.12) (0.20) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.18)
INST -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.008
(0.57) (0.85) (0.74) (1.91)* (0.57) (0.13) (0.52) (2.37)**
Ln(POP) 0.023 -0.732 0.061 -0.639 -0.013 -0.679 0.002 -0.723
(0.32) (3.51)*** (0.87) (3.35)*** (0.17) (3.36)*** (0.03) (3.96)***
NPVPPG/Y t-1 0.036 0.066 0.059 0.108
(2.23)** (3.45)*** (3.14)*** (4.43)***
ARR/Y t-1 0.014 -0.077 -0.086 -0.099 -0.044
(1.04) (5.05)*** (5.26)*** (5.93)*** (2.18)**
Constant 0.425 0.105 7.427 -0.125 7.305 0.427 0.036 6.617 0.128 8.171
(40.40)*** (0.18) (4.04)*** (0.21) (4.22)*** (39.33)*** (0.06) (3.72)*** (0.24) (4.98)***
N. obs. 160 132 132 131 132 159 131 132 131 131
N. countries 29 27 27 27 27 28 27 27 27 27
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note:  * Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. 24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
Table B1
vARIAblE DEFINITIONS AND SOURcES, DONORS
Variable Variable Name Definition Source
ODA Official development assistance  Net ODA including debt relief; US$, 
current prices, millions
OECD-DAC
DR Debt relief given by donors Debt forgiveness total; current US$, 
net disbursements, millions
OECD-DAC
GOVBAL Fiscal balance Budget balance as share of GDP OECD
Ln(GDPPC) logarithm per capita GDP Logarithm of per capita GDP in US$ OECD
RER Real exchange variation Deviation of the real exchange rate 
from its long-run average
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics; and JP Morgan
Table B2
vARIAblE DEFINITIONS AND SOURcES, REcIPIENTS
Variable Variable Name Definition Source
ODA Official development assistance  Net ODA from all donors including 
debt relief
OECD-DAC
DR Net debt relief Net debt relief from all donors  OECD-DAC
DR1 Debt relief received by recipients Principal forgiven + interest 
forgiven; US$
WB / GDF
Ln(GDPPC) logarithm per capita GDP Logarithm per capita GDP; PPP 
(constant 2000 international $)
WB / WDI
PPG Public and publicly guaranteed 
external debt
Public and publicly guaranteed 
external debt; total
WB /GDF
GDP GDP GDP; current US$ WB / WDI
Exports Exports of goods, services and 
income; US$
WB / GDF
ARR Arrears Principal arrears on LDOD + 
Interest arrears on LDOD
WB / GDF
Ln(POP) Logarithm population Logarithm total population UNCTAD Glob Stat / 
demographic and social 
indicators
INST Freedom House Index  Freedom measure, measured on 
a zero to twelve scale, with zero 
representing the lowest degree of 




UN Security Council Seat UN security council seat, with zero 
representing no security council 




HIPC HIPC HIPC countries, with zero 
representing no HIPC, and one 
representing HIPC
World Bank classification25 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
Notes
 1  From now on I will use the term “developing countries” to 
identify both developing countries and transition econo-
mies. 
 2  The weighed average indicates a 10 percentage points 
decline in external debt share. This corresponds to ap-
proximately 25 per cent of the original share. The simple 
average shows a 5 percentage point decline, corresponding 
to approximately 9 per cent of the original share.
 3  International Development Association (IDA) and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) “Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) -- Status of Implementation”.
 4  The three documents are available at the following web-
sites (all accessed on 6/2/2008): http://www.un.org/Docs/
journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/CONF.198/11;
   http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/62/217;
   http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/62/550. 
 5  The fact that I focus on three issues out of seven does not 
mean that the other four are less important. The choice of 
these three topics was jointly dictated by my comparative 
advantages and the need of keeping the paper brief. 
 6  Countries are classified as Low Risk if all debt indicators 
are below the debt burden threshold and will remain below 
this threshold even if the countries suffer a relatively large 
negative shock. Countries are classified as Moderate Risk 
if debt indicators are below the debt burden threshold but 
the country could breach the threshold in case of negative 
shock. Countries are classified as High Risk if the base-
line projections indicate that the country will breach the 
threshold. Countries are classified as In Debt Distress if 
their debt ratios are in breach of the thresholds. For more 
details, see World Bank (2006b). 
 7  Of course, they benefit from the concessional element 
which is part of all IDA loans. 
 8  Sachs (2000) criticizes the Framework on both grounds: 
“The current targets of debt reduction are based on an ut-
terly phony “Debt Sustainability Analysis” that couldn’t 
pass muster in a first-year economics class. Indeed, the 
phrase “debt sustainability analysis” is truly Orwellian in 
scale of distortion. The IMF and World Bank procedures 
for measuring sustainability have absolutely nothing to do 
with ability to pay, and 100 per cent to do with the arbitrary 
limits on debt relief laid down by the G-7 at the Cologne 
Summit. The IMF and World Bank documents should be 
re-labeled as “Debt Relief Allowed by the G-7,” rather 
than “Debt Sustainability Analysis.” At least the world 
would complain less about the roles of the IMF and World 
Bank in this sham, and turn the spotlight on the creditor 
countries instead.”
 9  The intellectual foundation for the link between the CPIA 
Index and debt sustainability is a well-known paper 
by Aart Kraay and Vikram Nehru (2006). While this is 
an excellent paper, it is peculiar that an institution that 
preaches transparency bases such important policy deci-
sions on an index that is not fully disclosed to the public. 
Thomas (2007) argues that the CPIA has been subject to 
detailed testing which has generally ruled out any bias in 
the construction of the index. But again, to the best of my 
knowledge, these tests have been run inside the Bank and 
by Bank staff and not by external evaluators.
  10  Kraay and Nehru (2006) show that, compared to a “naïve 
model”, the three variables included in their model increase 
the success rate in predicting a crisis by about 20–25 per 
cent. It is open to discussion whether this is a lot or a little. 
However, I think that the comparison with the naïve model 
is misleading. Assume that one regresses debt distress 
episodes over the level of debt, GDP growth and, say, infla-
tion and then computes by how much this simple model 
improves her ability to predict a debt crisis. This researcher 
would probably get some improvement with respect to a 
naïve model. Yet, most people would find objectionable 
the formulation of debt thresholds only based on the level 
of inflation. But inflation, while less sexy than an overall 
measure of policies, is more transparent, less subjective, 
and easier to measure than the CPIA. 
  11  Kraay and Nehru (2006) do an excellent job in trying to 
establish a causal relationship going from policies to the 
probability of a debt distress episode. However, I am not 
convinced that they are 100 per cent successful in estab-
lishing this link. When one looks at the list of questions 
included in the CPIA one finds: (i) debt burden indicators 
that do not signal a reasonable risk of debt servicing dif-
ficulties and (ii) terms of new borrowing conducive to 
long-term debt sustainability. (Thomas, 2007). Any good 
country economist who has been following a country for 
a few years will probably know whether his/her country is 
at an increasing risk of a debt crisis (it is not necessary to 
predict the crisis with probability one, just have a sense if 
the risks are increasing). If this is the case, the CPIA can 
be interpreted as a good leading indicator of a crisis (a sort 
of credit rating), but not as a factor causing the crisis. 
  12  I should acknowledge that the various DSF documents state 
that “These debt-burden thresholds are not to be seen as 
rigid ceilings but as guideposts for informing debt sustain-
ability assessments” (IMF, 2007: 5). In practice, however, 
in presence of well-defined thresholds, the bureaucracy of 
the institutions tends to have strong incentives to adhere 
to them. 
  13  As the external debt of developing countries tends to be 
in foreign currency, a country’s ability to repay its debt 
will depend on the behavior of the real exchange rate 
which, in developing countries tends to be very volatile 
(Hausmann, Panizza and Rigobon, 2006). There should 
be no vulnerabilities for countries, like the United States, 
that can borrow abroad in their own currency (or better 
in a currency they can print). For a discussion of original 
sin and currency mismatches see Eichengreen, Hausmann 
and Panizza (2005a).
  14  See section IV.B.
  15  http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/
PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement. Page 18.
  16  Buiter (1985) suggests such and indicator of sustainability,
  
W   defined as:  SUS = ps – (g – r)   ––––– , where W is public
    GDP
  sector net worth, ps is the primary surplus, r is the real 
interest rate, and g is the economy’s growth rate. 
  17  Estimating the value of a country’s assets is a complicated 
exercise which requires several, sometimes unrealistic, 
assumptions. However, some countries do publish figure 
for both public debt and public assets. The most interesting 
example is New Zealand which, in compliance with its 
1989 Public Finance Act, reports figures for all govern-
ment owned financial and physical assets (including roads, 
bridges, and schools). 
  18  Things become more complicated if one recognizes that not 
all debt relief has to do with the cancellation of performing 26 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 51
debt. In some cases, creditors cancel debt because they rec-
ognize that the debtor will never pay. While this is counted 
as debt relief, conceptually it is not debt relief because it 
does not liberate any resource. A better definition would 
be: AID=NETAID+EDR, where EDR is effective debt 
relief (i.e. debt relief that reduces transfers from debtors 
to creditors).
  19  Composition effects due to the unit of analysis can play 
an important role. Consider the following example: in the 
world there is only one donor and there are ten recipients. 
In year t the donor gives $1,000 million of aid net of 
debt relief and no debt relief, in year t+1 the donor gives 
$970 million of aid net of debt relief and $100 million of 
debt relief. When we evaluate additionality from the do-
nor’s point of view, we find α = –0.3 (1 dollar of debt relief 
crowded out $0.3 of other forms of aid). Now let’s look 
at the recipients and assume that there is one large recipi-
ent and ten small recipients. In year t, each of the small 
recipients gets $10 million of aid and the large recipient 
gets $910 million of aid and nobody gets debt relief. In year 
t+1, each of the small recipients gets $10.1 million of aid 
net of debt relief and the large recipient gets $879.1 mil-
lion (879.1 =  970–90.9) of aid net of debt relief. Moreover 
each small recipient receives $1 million of debt relief 
and the big recipient receives $91 (91 = 100–9) million of 
debt relief. Hence, the small recipients have α = 0.1 and 
the big recipient has α =  –0.34 (–0.34 = (879.1–910)/91). 
Since there are 9 small recipients and one big recipient, 
the average value of α is 0.056.
  20  The fact that the coefficient has increased in the recent 
years contradicts the World Bank’s (2006a) finding that 
debt relief under HIPC has become more additional in 
recent years. 
  21  This is not surprising if we consider that some multilateral 
agencies (like the Inter-American Development Bank) 
have been asked to participate in the MDRI without receiv-
ing additional resources. 
  22  The discussion in this section is based on joint work with 
Eduardo Borensztein, Barry Eichengreen and Eduardo 
Levy Yeyati. 
  23  Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) show that recorded 
deficits explain a small variance of debt growth in develop-
ing countries (the share of variance explained by recorded 
deficits ranges between 3 and 23 per cent). 
  24  Countries are, however, starting to issue catastrophe (CAT) 
bonds. For a discussion of the benefits of country catastro-
phe insurance, see Borensztein, Cavallo and Valenzuela 
(2007). 
  25  The plan has four steps: (i) development of a basket of 
inflation-indexed currencies of emerging market countries 
(the “EM index”); (ii) issuance of debt denominated in 
the EM index by multilateral development banks, to fund 
lending in the same exotic currencies; (iii) have G-10 sov-
ereigns do the same, issuing a portion of their debt in this 
index and swap their currency exposure with the countries 
in the EM index; (iv) encourage institutional investors 
and mutual funds to create products that add credit risk to 
the index. Hausmann and Rigobon (2005) have instead a 
proposal for de-dollarizing concessional lending. 
  26  For discussions of GDP-Indexed Bonds, see Borensztein 
and Mauro (2004); and Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006).
  27  This is not true for all countries. In some cases, notably 
China, reserve accumulation has been financed largely by 
issuing domestic currency (a non-interest bearing debt) or 
bonds that carry a low interest rate. However, even in this 
case there could be a cost of carry linked to the depreciation 
of the United States dollar vis-à-vis the local currency. 
  28  Summers (2006) suggests that reserves exceeding the 
Guidotti-Greenspan rule (stating that reserves should be 
enough to cover one year of capital account liabilities) 
should be invested in stocks rather than industrial coun-
tries’ treasury bills. 
  29  There are now proposals for a revamped CCL which would 
go under the name of Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL). 
Kregel (2007) provides a discussion of the RAL and its 
antecedents. 
  30  This is easier said than done. William Easterly has ac-
cumulated an impressive amount of evidence showing 
that foreign aid has not been very effective in promoting 
economic growth in receiving countries and that some coun-
tries have been able to jump-start growth without receiving 
foreign aid. However, the fact that aid has not been effective 
in the past is no proof that aid cannot be effective.
  31  The following discussion is based on Panizza (2008).
  32  IMF staff members tried to estimate the participation of 
nonresident in the domestic capital markets of emerging 
market countries and found it that it was often impossible 
to obtain data (see IMF, 2006: 95–96).
  33  IMF (2006, 2007) reports that while debt sustainability 
analysis exercises claim to use an external debt definition 
based on the residency of the ultimate holder, for the major-
ity of countries there is no information on the residency of 
ultimate holders and hence external debt is set to be equal 
to debt issued in the international market. 
  34  The first three points are of particular relevance for low 
income countries, the fourth point is of particular relevance 
for middle income countries with market access, and the 
last three points apply to both group of countries. 
  35  For a discussion see Borensztein and Panizza (2008); and 
Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008). 
  36  This annex is based on joint work with Matthias Rau. 
I would like to thank Mareen Buschmann for excellent 
research assistance. 
  37  The control variables include the log of GDP per capita of 
the donor (lnGDPPC), the real exchange rate of the donor 
(RER), the budget deficit of the donor (GOVBAL), and a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 during the years of the 
HIPC initiative (HIPC).
  38  Our sample does not include Luxembourg (the 22nd 
DAC country) because some of the control variables are 
missing. 
  39  See section III.B for a definition of additionality. 
  40  Column 1 presents random effects estimates without year 
fixed effects, column 2 reports random effects estimates 
with year fixed effects, column 3 reports fixed effects 
estimates without year fixed effects, and column 4 reports 
fixed effects estimates with year fixed effects.
  41  Stingy countries are those in the bottom quarter of the 
distribution of aid as a share of GDP, generous countries 
are those in the top quarter, and the intermediate countries 
are the remaining 50 per cent. Columns 5–8 use the same 
estimation techniques used in columns 1–4. Columns 9 and 
10 reproduce the estimates of columns 7 and 8 by using a 
median regression with bootstrapped standard errors (this 
estimation method puts less weight on outliers).
  42  The control variables include the log of GDP per capita of 
the donor (lnGDPPC), a measure of institutional quality 
(INST), a dummy variable that takes value one when the 
recipient has a seat in the UN security council (SEAT UN 
SC), the log of population (lnPOP), face value of PPG 27 The External Debt Contentious Six Years after the Monterrey Consensus
external debt over GDP (PPG/Y), and net present value 
of PPG debt over GDP (NPVPPG/Y).
  43  In tables A2–A4 debt relief and arrears data are from GDF. 
The results change if we measure arrears from GDF and 
debt relief from OECD-DAC data. 
 44  We obtain data on ODANET by subtracting all donors net 
debt relief (source OECD-DAC) from all donors total net 
ODA (source OECD-DAC). 
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